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Abstract Rapid acceleration in the science of genetic
engineering of infectious diseases has outpaced legal and
ethical frameworks for dealing with such research. Dual-
use research of concern (DURC), which can be used for
good or for harm, raises new questions about potential
harm to human beings which have not traditionally been
considered by medical research ethics committees, and
may require us to revise and standardize ethical guidelines
worldwide for the conduct of such research. The weighing
of harm versus benefit of research as traditionally consid-
ered on an individual level needs to be considered on a
population level for infectious diseases DURC, and on a
global level due to the potential for transmissible infections
to cause a pandemic, thus affecting people in places far
from where the research was conducted. The harm of such
research could result from either laboratory accidents or
bioterrorism. As an example, engineered organisms such as
influenza could result in an unnatural pandemic, affecting
and harming people who were never informed of the
research nor consented to it. The debate to date has been
held among medical researchers and has been focused on
the rights of researchers and scientific freedom. The com-
munity is also a stakeholder with rights, and DURC done in
one country could cause harm to people in other countries
who were never included in the debate. The first require-
ment is to inform and engage the public as a stakeholder in
such research, and to make deliberations about DURC
public and transparent. Secondly, governance structures
and guidelines are not uniform internationally, and only
some institutions and countries have specific DURC poli-
cies, none of which are enforceable. Consistent interna-
tional guidelines and uniform, enforceable global
governance models need to be developed for medical
research ethics committees around potential population
harm and benefit of DURC. Finally, researchers should be
required to quantify potential population risks and benefits
of DURC before it is approved. Models for quantifying
risk–benefit equations could be drawn from health eco-
nomics, with the onus on researchers to demonstrate that
potential benefit outweighs potential harm. These would be
positive steps towards protecting the interests and rights of
all potentially affected populations in the case of trans-
missible infectious disease DURC. Past quantum changes
in medical research governance such as mandatory regis-
tration of clinical trials show that major changes in research
culture can be achieved. Current systems leave community
stakeholders vulnerable to potential harms of infectious
diseases DURC, and need to be addressed in a consistent
and comprehensive manner internationally to ensure ethi-
cal obligations are met.
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In the field of infectious diseases, acceleration in science
has outpaced our legal and ethical frameworks. Dual-use
research of concern is a term applied to life sciences
research which is conducted with the intent of benefitting
human health, but could also be misused to cause harm
(Selgelid 2009; WHO). DURC is now a publicly available
reality (Herfst et al. 2012; Imai et al. 2012). This includes
creation of synthetic viruses, and since the 2011
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controversy over H5N1 avian influenza DURC, genetic
engineering of pathogens that are not infectious to humans,
to make them unnaturally infectious (Herfst et al. 2012;
Imai et al. 2012). This new era in DURC raises questions
about potential population-level harm to human beings
which have not traditionally been considered by human
research ethics committees or institutional review boards
(IRBs), and may require us to revise systems and processes
for conduct of such research. Whilst some individual sci-
entific bodies, journals and institutions have created poli-
cies around DURC, there is no standardized approach to
consideration of DURC when such research is proposed,
nor to considering the population health impacts on a
global level. In the USA, the 2004 Fink Report (National
Research Council 2004) recommended the creation of a
National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense. The
NSABB was created and faced its first major challenge in
2011, over the controversy about publication of methods
for engineered transmissible H5N1 influenza virus (Keim
2012). The concern is that if the methods for engineering
potentially pandemic strains of influenza were made public,
terrorists may use these methods to cause harm to popu-
lations. The NSABB initially recommended censorship of
publication of full research methods, but later, after an
outcry from scientists, reversed the decision in 2012
(Fedson and Opal 2013). The governance of DURC has
been questioned after this decision, with questions raised
about process, conflicts of interest, lack of transparency,
and decision-making in the NSABB (Brown 2012; Roos
2014). DURC could potentially be self-regulated by sci-
entists, or by government, or by a combination (Resnik
2010). It has been argued that self-regulation is flawed
because of obvious vested interests and conflicts of interest
which would heavily favour publication of DURC (Sel-
gelid 2007; van Aken 2006). A combination of government
and scientist regulation is preferable given the vested
interests of medical researchers in regulating their own
activities. Even a body such as the NSABB has limitations
in its remit. In fact, the USA is the only country to have an
advisory body such as the NSABB, which is advisory only,
cannot enforce recommendations and has broad and
sometimes ambiguous definitions of DURC (Dubov 2014;
Resnik 2010). The NSABB has further been plagued with
controversy after sacking members who were thought to be
more likely to oppose DURC, has been accused of conflicts
of interests, and has suffered significant reduction in scope
and remit in 2014 (Roos 2014).
The example of influenza DURC is a good case study to
illustrate the need for new approaches to considering and
regulating DURC. Infectious diseases are unique because
many are transmissible from human to human, and can
cause epidemics and even pandemics within a relatively
short period of time. Therefore, DURC involving
contagious pathogens such as influenza can potentially
impact people, populations, and countries far from the site
of the research, who were not informed nor involved in the
decision-making process. In 2013, a group of vaccine
researchers petitioned the US president’s bioethics com-
mittee, arguing that influenza DURC and other such
research were ‘‘morally and ethically wrong’’ (Roos 2013).
There are several ethical dimensions to such research.
Influenza DURC and publication of such methods is
associated with an unknown probability of resulting in an
unnatural human pandemic (Osterholm and Henderson
2012), which would result in people who were never
consulted and never consented to the research being
affected. An unnatural pandemic could occur as a result
of a either a laboratory accident or deliberate release by
terrorists who reproduce published DURC methods.
During the 2011 H5N1 controversy, scientists in favour of
DURC publication argued that such research was safe and
that laboratories could be trusted to avoid accidents. Yet
in 2014 alone, four serious safety breaches involving
anthrax, smallpox, avian influenza, and most recently
Ebola, in leading laboratories in the US CDC and the
NIH, show that the risk of laboratory accidents is real
(Reardon 2014; Sun and Achenbach 2014). Bioterrorism
with infectious diseases has occurred throughout human
history and remains an ongoing threat (Alibek and
Handelman 1999; To¨ro¨k et al. 1997). However, the cur-
rent acceleration of DURC and public availability of
methods for engineering of viruses raises the risk to new
levels, by increasing the accessibility of such methods by
those who wish to use it for nefarious purposes (Oster-
holm and Henderson 2012). It is timely to review the
additional population health ethical considerations raised
by infectious diseases DURC, and processes for approval
of such research.
Modern medical research ethics committees originate
from the Nuremberg code and the 1964 declaration of
Helsinki, incorporating the lessons learned from Nazi
Medicine (Hanauske-Abel 1996). The development of
medical research ethics has been influenced mainly, and
rightly, with a focus on the individual patient and inter-
ventions which only affect patients subjected to that
intervention. The fundamental principles of voluntary
informed consent of the human subject in medical research,
assessing risk against expected benefit, avoidance of
unnecessary pain and suffering and avoidance of actions
that injure human patients are accepted in medical ethics,
but have not been well considered on a population level as
they pertain to infectious diseases and contagion (World
Medical Association 2013). Influenza DURC involves
animal research and would generally be submitted to ani-
mal ethics committees for initial consideration. These
committees focus on the ethics of animal research and
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avoidance of unnecessary harm and suffering to animals. If
the overarching institutions of animal ethics committees, or
the funding body, have a DURC policy, the application
would then be referred for specific consideration of the
risks versus benefits to human populations. However,
referral to a HREC for consideration of population-level
harm to humans as an ethical issue is not routine. HRECs
could mandatorily be tasked with considering the potential
benefits (such as development of drugs and vaccines) and
the potential harms of DURC at the population level. They
could use a harm–benefit framework to consider ethical
aspects of animal infectious diseases DURC for human
beings.
Research which generates newly transmissible patho-
genic organisms raises ethical issues that go well beyond
the individual patient. It is true that individual treatments,
for example, anti-hypertensive medications, can have an
impact on populations when they are recommended in
policy or guidelines—however, even in this case, each
individual who commences these medications makes an
individual, informed choice after consultation with their
physician to do so, and their decision does not impact on
other people. This is not the case with a dangerous trans-
missible pathogen capable of causing a pandemic, where
the initial research is in animals, but where human beings
who were never informed and who never made any choice
around the matter may become infected. Further, decisions
made by a research regulatory body in one country may
have ramifications around the world in the case of a
pandemic.
It has been argued that to date, deliberations around
DURC have been cloaked in secrecy and lacked transpar-
ency (Dubov 2014). It is important to acknowledge that it
is not only the health sector and scientists who are stake-
holders in infectious diseases DURC. DURC raises an
ethical concern for which all of humanity are stakeholders,
and yet are kept outside of the debate, which has publicly
raged almost exclusively between health and medical
research stakeholders (Fouchier et al. 2012; Osterholm and
Henderson 2012). The public have a high level of trust in
medical research and in the health systems which serve
them, and as a scientific community, we have an ethical
obligation to ensure that they are adequately informed and
have a voice as stakeholders. Given that all people in the
world are stakeholders in the potential benefits and harms
of the creation of transmissible pathogens with pandemic
potential, one could argue that there needs to be informed
consent from the population about research which may
inadvertently affect them. At the least, the public interest
and rights of populations should be considered in such
research.
Whilst it is difficult to gain informed consent from a
whole population for DURC, this does not remove the
ethical obligation to do so. One approach is to task com-
munity representatives on HRECs with advocating for the
community interest, but this may not be adequate. Beyond
this, other approaches may include public consultation,
where submissions are called upon and some parts of the
deliberations of HRECs are made public for DURC, in the
same way that the deliberations of Institute of Medicine
panels or the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) are made public (CDC 2014). In these
examples, the public consultation and transparency are
driven by the recognition of the significant interests of the
public as stakeholders. Public registration of DURC along
the same lines as mandatory clinical trial registration could
also be considered. These would be positive steps towards
transparency and informing and engaging the community
as a stakeholder in DURC.
Another supplementary approach to considering such
research includes requiring researchers to quantify poten-
tial population risks and benefits, using available data and
probability theory, and make these equations public before
dual-use research is approved. Models for quantifying risk–
benefit equations could be drawn from health economics
and the requirements for government subsidization of
medications in many countries (Beutels et al. 2008). Risk
analysis is rarely used in medicine and health as it is in
other disciplines, but models to quantify the probabilities of
benefits and harms for DURC could be quite feasibly
developed using risk analysis methods (Lipsitch and In-
glesby 2014).
Finally, inconsistencies in governance and regulation of
DURC around the world and between institutions must be
addressed for the global risks of DURC to be meaningfully
tackled. Specific internationally uniform and enforceable
guidelines and global governance systems need to be
urgently developed for IRBs and HREC’s around potential
population harm and benefit of DURC to ensure that the
interests and rights of all potentially affected populations
are considered in the spirit of the Declaration of Helsinki.
DURC, which has an associated risk of harm to populations
through contagion, is a new challenge for medical research
ethics and requires us to abide by the accepted principles of
consent, beneficence, and avoidance of harm. Achieving a
new model for ethical governance of DURC is achievable
when the example of clinical trial registration is considered
historically. A decade ago, public registration of clinical
trials was the exception, not the norm. Today, with a
concerted global effort, funding agencies, medical journals,
and institutions all work together in unison to ensure that
an unregistered trial would be very unlikely to get funded
or published in a reputable journal. Looking further back
historically, the requirement for informed consent of
human subjects in medical research and onus of proof on
researchers to show avoidance of harm were not present
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prior to the Nuremberg doctors trials and the development
of the Nuremberg code, the precursor to the Declaration of
Helsinki. These are now internationally consistent
requirements that are enforced by human research ethics
committees everywhere and accepted by the scientific
community. Therefore, it is possible to create a new global
accountability and governance for DURC in response to
rapid recent acceleration in the science of such research. In
summary, the key elements of such an approach include
mechanisms for informing and consulting with the public
as a stakeholder; requirements for researchers to quantify
the risks and benefits of DURC; and standardization of
enforceable international guidelines and governance
structures for DURC globally in recognition of the poten-
tial global impact of engineered transmissible pathogens.
The potentially serious risk to the global community posed
by DURC cannot be minimized or trivialized for the per-
sonal benefit of scientists involved in DURC. There is an
ethical obligation to address the governance of DURC
globally and collaboratively, in a transparent manner which
is free of conflicts of interest.
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